The alleged death of monetarism could not have come at a more inappropriate time. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz Imave just published a massive volume entitled Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom: Their Relation to Income, Prices and Interest Rates 1867-197.5 .Ĩn that text, they present extensive amid detailed evidence that supports the basic rnonetarist propositions regardimig the impact ofmoney on the economny." It would he both ironic amid puzzling if, at the very time that their findings are published, we were to discover that these fundamental relationships suddenly have broken down.
Yet, this claim is precisely the one that critics of rnonetarism have made. They charge that recent financial innovations and the expanding use of previous financial innovations have so distorted the measure and meaning of money that monetarism, no matter how well supported by historical studies, is no longer valid.
6 Since this claim has been mnade before and found, in each instance, to be groundless, it should he niet with considerable skepticism.' 'Milton Friedman This article attempts to assess whether current rumors of the demise of monetarism are greatly exaggerated.
A TAlE OF TWO MONETARISMS: 'A Ii NIEI}l~PROPO'II EONS "5 5 O.RMATIVE PRESCRIPTION Perhaps the most significant obstacle to urmderstanding many of the current arguments, hoth for and against monetarism, is that the term typically is bandied ahout with little or no specific referemice to its intended meaning. This is a problem because monetarismn can refer to two very different kinds of statemnents. Monetarism can refer to specific, testahle, scientific propositions; it also can be used to indicate a set of policy suggestions or alternatives to achieve desired economic goals.
8 In the scientific sense, we can assess easily whether mnonetarism has failed. In the normative or policy sense, however, it may he impossible to agree whether monetarist policies have even been attempted, let alone have failed.
illonetari em as a Science
Looked at in a scientific sense, monetarismn is the label attached to a common set of theoretical and empim'ical propositions regarding the significant and stable relationship between the momiey stock and other important economic variables. There is a mnethodology, common to all sciences, that is used to assess the logical validity and empirical stmpport for competing theories. Scientific theories never die by themselves; thes' are ahamidoned omilv when a better theory comes along. If monetarismn, in the scientific sense of the word, has failed, it must have succumbed to an alternative non-monetarist explanation.
It is clear that, within the scientific framework of the rise and demise of theories, mnonetarism has not heen superseded by newer or superior theories of inflation or real output or spemmding growth.
9 Instead, critics charge that the behavioral relationships that worked well in the past have shifted and that the previously stahle relationships underlying the mnonetarist view have now become unstable. If this has occurred, then the propositions labeled monetarism would become less useful. In the extremne, they would even be rel'his distinction is discussed briefly in Milton Friedman's ''Defining Monetarism,"°T he presumed failure of all economic theories has been noted recesmtly by John Gm'eenwald, "~Vhere Rave All the Answers Cone?" Time (January 17, 1983), pp. 36-37. placed by somne previously less useful, non-monetarist theory. This issue is analyzed in the latter part of this article.
Monetansm as an Economic Policy
In addition to its scientific meaning, however, monetarismn also can be used in a normative or policy sense. As such, it serves as a label for a set of economic policy prescriptions intemided to achieve certain ceonomnic goals, Of cotmrse, such policy prescriptions presuppose that mnonetarism, in the scientific sense, is valid and that policvmnakers cami exert some control over money growth.
There are several fundamnental problems with attempting to assess the success or failure of normative monetarismn. First, there may he no common agreement on whether a mnonetarist policy has heen followed; consequently, it will he virtuall impossible to demonstrate that it has failed. To illustrate this prob1cm, consider the data shown in table 1. A number of countries have announced a variety of monetan' aggregate targets over the past three years; six of these are represented in the table. Because these countries have adopted and publicly announced such targets, ous commentators have labeled their policies as monotarist. Becatise these targets generally were not achieved and because economic conditions in these countries over the past three years were generally poor, it has been charged that monetarism has finled.
At the samne time, other analysts have used the samne data to support the opposite conclusion. Because the announced targets were not achieved, they argue, the actual behavior of the monetary authorities was clearly non-monetarist. Further, the resultant adverse ceonomie conditions are used to demonstrate why monotarist policies should have heen fbllowed.
A prime examnple of the problem associated with determnining whether a specific policy is monetarist is the widespread disagreement over whether the Federal Reserve has been following a "monetarist" policy since October 1979. mo When a group of polic~nnakers, economists and financial analysts were asked this question recently by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, their answers ranged from the strongly affirmative to the strongly negative to the inscrutably '°OnOctober 6, 1979 , the Federal Resen'e announced that it had changed its operating procedures to achieve enhanced control over money. This change in policy implementation was relaxed in October 1982, 198~l cryptic." The basic problem is simnpl~that reasonable people can differ both on their interpretation of whether a specific policy is monetarist and whether it is being carried otmt in a monetarist fashion.
A different problem with assessments of policy failures is that policymnakers and the general public appear to shift back and forth annong a variety of goals; further, they often fail to agree among themselves on the likely outcome of policy actions. tQ Flip-flopping between policy goals can lead to erratic policy actions scientific sense, has failed. If scientific monctarism has failed, then discussions over normative monctarist issues arc mncaninglcss; there can be no useful nionetarist policies if the relationships between mnoncy growth and other imnportant economic variables are unstable or nonexistent. On the other hand, if scientific mnonctarism'n has not failed, discussions over whether some policy can be labeled as monetarist arc mere bagatelles; what mnatters is not the label attached to the policy, bmit the actual pattern of money growth that the policy produces. The crucial issue that must be addressed is the success or failure of scientific momictarismn.
FOURS •WF.LL-KNOWN SCIENTIFIC \IO'\ 11 ;RIS 1 PROPOSI I ION S H W F. TH.EY FAILED?
There are a large number of economic propositions that have come to be associated with monetarism, or at least with individuals who have been labeled mnonetarists. 13 We do not intend to investigate all such propositions. Instead, we foemis on wimat we consider to be four key monetarist propositions. The first three propositions concern 'what money does"; they represent the relationship between money growth and time growth of aggregate spending, prices and real output. The fourth proposition focuses on the controllability of money growth. The first three propositions demonstrate why money matters; the fourth proposition investigates whether monetary policy matters.
Proposition 1: There is a close and stable relationship between the growth ofmoney and the growth oftotal spending. This relationship can he investigated in a variety ofways. One simple way is to compare the growth ofMl, the narrow monetary aggregate consisting of currency and checkable deposits, to the growth of aggregate spending, measured by Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is done in chart 1 for a large number of countries for the 1969 to 1980 period. It is clear from the chart that, in general, there is a very close relationship between growth in money and growth in total spending; the vast majority ofthe countries arc clustered close to the 45-degree line that denotes equal growth rates for both mnoncy and spending over the period.
fhvorites arc'. miscreant, flinty-everl, macho, knee-jerk, simple, simplistic and mnechanieal. Civen the ahuve varieties of both muonctarism amid monetarists, it is crucial, in any' evaluation of rnonetarisrms, that the term be cam'efully defined amid consistently used. where t, M and E arc the annualized quarterly growth rates of GNP, Ml and high-employment govcrnmnenst expenditures, respectively, m~and e~represent the impact of current and lagged values of M and E, m'espectively, the constant term represents the impact of other influensees on CNP growth, ansd i = 0 4 shows that the equation investigates the extent to which GNP growth in quarter t is affected by the current and past four quarters' growth in NI and E. Table 2 shows the results of estimating this equation over the period from 11/1960 to IV/1982. There are three key aspects to these results. First, as the R 2
shows, the estimated equation accounts for a sizable proportion of the actual fluctuations in GNP growth; in this instance, about 30 perecnst of the variation in Y is explained by the variables on the right-hansd side ofthe equation. Second, the explanatory power of the equation is derived solely from the monetary variables; only the estimated coefficients ons M are statistically different from zero. Third, the sum of the coefficients on M is not significantly different from one; this indicates that, other things unchanged, any given change in the growth of Ml will produce the same change in the growth of GNP within five quarters.
Another way of looking at this relationship can be seen in chart 2, which contains the year-to-year growth rates of nominal GNP and Ml for the United States. Clearly, changes in the growth of GNP from one year to the next are positively associated with changes in the growth of Ml.
If monetarism has fhilcd due to recent financial innovations, then the relationships estimated in table 2 and shown in chart 2 should have eroded substantially since late 1979.14 This purported erosion is not apparent in chart 2~the link between money growth and ecomsomnie activity since 111/1979 seems no different mmsimscc it is msever possible to identify a single begimimsimig poimit for a commtiouous process like flssamscial imsoovatiomi, the date ofthe Fed's ehuusge in operating procedures (Oetohcr 1879) is mmsed as the hs'cak poisst ims tlsis. and all s ubsequemst, analysis. '~bsoh4e statues oft atultea in parentheses Stafisimoalty signmfieant at the 5 percent tevet from that which existed during the previous two decades.
Of course visual evidence is nc er conelu 'iv cappearances always can be deceiving. What is significant is that there is nso statistical support that the relationship between money and spending in the St. Louis cqmmation has broken down in reeemst v cams When the parameters of the St. Lommis equation vs crc tested for their structural stability the hypothesis that tlsc structure had slipped' in the later period was rejected. 1 Thus there does not ippcar to has c been a where D, a rlummuv variable, equals 1 fromu 11/ t960 to 111/1979 amid 0 othcnvisc. The stability test for the coefficients on Ml growth is eomsducted by testing the joimit hypothesis that all of the estimates of m 2ã re simultamieouslv equal to zero. The calculated F-statistic for this test is 2.01: the critical F-valise is 2.72 for the 5 pereemst signifmeamice level, Cousequemitlv, the hypothesis that the coefficiemits sumi Ml growth lsaye chassged since 111/1979 cars he rejected at the 5 pereemit sigrsificamscc level. 
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Chart 4
Deviations of Short-Run Money Growth from Trend U Once again, there appears to be no significant breakdown in this relationship after late 1979: the long-run rate of money growth has declined during the past 3½ years as has the rate of inflation. Moreover, an econometric investigation indicates that there has been no breakdown in the Mi-inflation relatiomiship over the past three years' 9
Proposition 3: Short-run changes in money growth, i,fs'uffieiently sharp, produce real output movements. Conceptually, a change in money growth creates a monetary disequilibrium: the quamitity of money that individuals desire to hold difl~rsfrom the quantity that they actually are holding. By altering their rate of spending, they attempt either to increase or to decrease their money holdings to a desired level. Eventually, as discussed previously, this change in the rate more rigorous investigation of a breakdown in the money growtls-inflatiomm retatiomishsip entails cundmmetimig a test simihan to that imi footmiote 15 for the imiflatiomi equation cited in footmiote 18. The c~slcuhatedF-statistic for this test is 1,53, well below the critical value of 2,72 at the 5 percemit significance level. l'he hypothesis tisat the coeffsciesets omi NIl growth in the infiatioms equatiomi have ehamigecl simice 111/1979 cams he rejected.
of aggregate spending will cause a change in the rate of inflation.
In the short run, however, producers cannot tell immediately whether this change in the rate of aggregate demand (spending) is permanent or merely temporary; thus, they respond initially by changing their rate of production. That is, the change in money growth results in a deviation of real economic activity from its "normal" rate. Only when the change in spending (motivated by the monetary disequilibrium) has been identified as permanent will producers change their prices and return production back to its normal rate. Thus, the impact ofa change in the rate of nsoney growth shows up initially and temporarily on output and employment. 20 This proposition is demonstrated in chart 4, vvhich reports the deviation of short-run Nil growth (inca2t
For a discussion ofthe niicroeconomie ratiomiahe behind the timing ofthe effect of chiasiges in mnuuev growth on real output (istitiahly) amid prices (ultimately), sec Carlsors, '"[lie I 5 ag From Momiey to Prices,,'' pp. 6-8. sured by its two-quarter moving average) from its longrun trend (measured by its 12-quarter moving average)-The shaded areas represent periods defined as recessions by tbse National Bureatt of Economic Research. Every downturn in economic activity in the last two decades has been associated with a substantial slowing in money growth relative to its trend; every substantive slowdown in short-run Mi growth has been associated with ami economic downturn. 2t
Although the 1966 episode was not technically labeled a recession, the United States experienced a "growth recession"; real GNP growth fell from about 10 percent to zero following the draniatic decline in money growth in 1966,
There appears to he no breakdown in this relationship since late 1979-In fact, this proposition is supported quite strongly by recent events. For examplc, money growth declined substantially in early 1980 (almost 5 percentage points below its treisd); accompanying this decline in Ml growth, real economic activity declined rapidly and dramatically. By the third quarter of 1980, money growth had rebounded and the economy began pulling omit of a short-lived recession. When short-rtsn money growth declined from 5½ percentage points above its trend in IV/1980 to about 4 percentage points below its trend by IV/1981 (an unprecedented drop), however, the economy headed into its second recession in as many years, a recessiors from which we have only reeemitly begun to recover. and lending to depository institutiorss, can control the stock of reserves held by depository institutions upon which these checkable deposits are based. As a result, the monetary authority can control the growth of money supply indirectly by controllimsg the rate of growth of these reserves. 22
In the very short run, changing asset preferences of individuals may cause discrepamicies between the rate of growth of reserves and that of checkable deposits. Yet, over longer periods of time, these growth rates eonformn closely across a wide variety of monetary imistitutions, as exhibited in chart 5 for a large number of countries. This chart illustrates that, over time, reserve growth and demand deposit growth are associated closely. Moreover, because checkable deposits are a large portion of the Ml definition of money, reserve growth is, then, a pmerequisite for money growthrchis analysis neglects the role that currency plays iii the money supply process. Since currency in the hands of the nonbank public is another potential source of bank reserves, changes in the public's demand for currency also may be the source ofmonetary expansion Further, there appears to be no breakdown in this relationship since late 1979. Except for the period of credit controls (II/i980-III/1980) there has been little difference between the m-ate of has gsowth and the rate of money growth during the post-III/1979 period. 26
A CLASH OF COMPETING MODELSM OM I &EIS [~S \O\-MO\E I 41415 i VIEWS OF THE ECONOMY
As stated earlier, monetarism can he rejected only if there is an alternative explanation of mnaeroeconomnic behavior that has greater explanatory or predictive poxs'er. The following experiment was conducted to ascertain whether the primarily non-monetarist economic theories imuherent in two of tile popular large macroeconomic models could explain economic behavior over the past three years as well as a moisetarist model. rrhe St. Louis equatiomu (equation 1) and the inflation equation cited in footnote 18 were estisnated over the period from 11/1960 to 111/1979. The rates of growth of nominal CNF (total spendimug). real CNP (real output) and the GNP price deflator then were forecast for the next 13 quarters (that is, from IV/1979 to IV/1982 . rchese forecasts were compared to those of the Wharton and the Chase Econometrics models. The average absolute forecast errors for each of these three models are reported in table 4; the quarterly forecast errors for each yariable are shown in charts 7, 8 and 9.
It should he noted, at the outset, that the empirical deck was stacked against the inonetarist forecasts; theỹ the stability issue is tested as in footnote 1.5 far the equation citedh ism footsuote 25. In this case, the calculated F-statistic is 1.64, below the critical value of 3,09 at the 5 percent significance level, Consequently, the hypothesis that the relationship hetweemi base growth amid money growth has changed since 111/1979 can he rejected. -12
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